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LIABILITY OF QUASI AND MUNICIPAL CORPORA
TIONS, AND THEIR OFFICERS, FOR NEGLIGENT
ACTS.
EVER since the case of Russell et al. v. The .en dwelling in the
County of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, decided by Lord KENYON in
George the Third's time, it has been the settled law, both of England and this country, that political subdivisions of the state, like
counties, towns, school-districts and the like, are not liable, at
common law, to actions for damages resulting either from the nonfeasance or misfeasance of the public officials of such organizations.
Among the reasons usually assigned why such actions are not
maintainable are,
1. That the plaintiff would have the right, as under the Statutes
of Hue and Cry, to levy his judgment upon and enforce satisfaction
out of the separate property of any inhabitant, whether such
inhabitant lived within the boundaries of such political organization
or not, at the time the injury occurred ; besides giving rise to a
multiplicity of actions to enforce contribution from every other
inhabitant living in such political organization at the time such
actions were begun, to the great annoyance of the public.
2. For want of a fund, belonging to such organization, legally
applicable to the payment of any such judgment.
Nor would the fact of the incorporation of such political organizations with the power of bringing and defending actions, which
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are usually incident to ordinary aggregate corporations, make the
slightest difference in the application of the principle, unless a fund
were provided to meet the payment of the judgment recovered; for
at common law, conferring such a power would not have the effect
of creating such a right of action where none existed before; and
besides, where an action of damages is brought against a corporation, such damages are not to be recovered against the corporators
in their individual capacity, but out of their corporate estate:
McKinnon v. Penson, 8 Exch. 319; s. c. 9 Id. 609; Carr v.
Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324.
And hence, in England, where a right of action has been hcld
to be maintainable against these quasi corporations, as counties and
hundreds, and in this country, against counties, school-districts and
the like, it is by virtue of some statute, as in the case of Hue
and Cry, manifesting, on the part of the law-making power, a clear
intention in this regard; and at common law, only in those cases
where the legislature has expressly created a fund out of which
such damages may be satisfied: Mersey -Docksv. Gibbs, Law Rep.
1 H. L. Cas. 93; s. c. 11 H. L. Cas. 686; Oliver v. Vorcester,
102 Mass. 501 ; Commissioners for Supply for Renfrewshire, 6
S. C. 259.
The true reasonfor the exemption, at common law.
We think, however, that the tiue reason why, in the absence of
any statutory provision, such actions are not maintainable against
these quasi corporations is, because they are created for political
purposes only, and are mere instrumentalities through which the
legislature administers the civil 'policy of the state, such as the
administration of justice, of finance, of education, the relief (,f
the poor, the maintenance of a military organization, and other
matters pertaining to the state, all of which are minutely regulated
by law, and for the support of which, a tallage as minutely circumscribed in its purposes, is imposed, and cannot, in any lawful way
be applied to any other purpose, and especially to the payment
of damages caused by the wrongful proceedings of the officers of
such organizations: Biddle v. Proprietorsof the -Docksand Canals
in Merrimac River, 7 Mass. 187; Mower v. Leicester, 9 Id. 247;
Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109;
Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 596; Smith on Reparation 29;
Findlaterv. -Duncan,McL. & Rob. 911; Commissioners of Supply for Renfrewshire, supra.
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The rule of non-liability extends to municipal corporations,sub
Modo.
And this rule of exemption from liability extends as well to
municipal corporations in all matters which are governmental and
political in their character, and where the duties are imposed solely
for public purposes, but not to the neglect of those special duties
which are imposed on them, with their consent, express or implied,
or where a special authority is conferred on them at their request,
for their own corporate benefit: Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray
543; Sullivan v. Boston, 126 Mass. 540; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16
N. Y. 158.
Or where, as a condition of receiving some special privilege, they
have assumed to discharge some public duty: Eastman v. .Meredith,
36 N. H. 295.
Instances of non-liability.
As falling within this principle it is held, that no action can be
maintained, at common law, against a town for neglecting to provide a system of public instruction, and suitable buildings for such
purpose, nor for an injury sustained by a scholar attending a
public school by reason of a dangerous excavation in the schoolhouse yard existing through the negligence of the town officers,
even though they knew of its existence: Bigelow v. Randolph, 14
Gray 541. Nor against a board of education for neglecting to
fence an open area upon the school grounds, into which a pupil,
without fault, fell and was seriously injured: Finch v. Board of
Education, 30 Ohio St. 47. Nor for injuries occasioned to a
scholar by reason of obstructions by lumps of ice in the approaches
to the school building: Sullivan v. Boston, supra. Nor for
injuries sustained from defects existing in a town building by a
voter properly in such building for the exercise of a public right:
Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284. Nor for damages resulting
to individuals from a failure to provide the necessary agencies for
extinguishing fires, or from the negligence of officers or other persons connected with the fire department: Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19; 2 Thompson on Negligence 731. Not
for injuries to the property of a citizen by a riotous assemblage of
persons, or for the neglect of the officers in not preserving the
peace, and preventing such injury: Western College, &c'., v. City
of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375; CVncinnativ. Cameron, 33 Id. 368;
Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Mon. 561; Ward v Louisville, 16
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Id. 193; Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allei 172. Nor for failure
to maintain a hydrant by which a fire might have been extinguished,
and the property of the plaintiff thereby saved from destruction:
Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 316.
Liable for injuriesresulting from negligence with respect to acts
done for corporate benefit.
But when they are not exercising governmental functions-those
legislative powers which they hold for public purposes solely, and
as a part of the sovereign power of the state-but in the exercise
of those private franchises which belong to them as creatures of the
law, for their corporate benefit, as in the management of property
or rights held by them for their own immediate profit, advantage
or emolument, although inuring ultimately to the general public,
they become liable like private individuals: Oliver v. Worcester,
102 Mass. 499; Providence v. Clapo, 17 How. 161; Hill v.
Boston, 122 Mass. 344. It may be difficult, at times, to distinguish between those acts. which will be held and regarded as the
exercise of legislative functions, solely for public purposes, and
characterized as governmental and political, and the exercise of
those private franchises and privileges, for the sole benefit of the
corporation, and for the abuse of which they will become liable to
a civil action for injuries sustained, and many a good lawyer may
stumble in his advice to a client simply because the reasons
assigned are either shadowy, fallacious or unphilosophical; but
still the distinction is well settled, and the illustrations of private
liability are too numerous to need citations.
Difference in liability between the neglect to exercise a Power,
and its negligent exercise.
Here, however, another distinction obtains which must not be
overlooked, and that is, between the neglect of duties by municipal corporations, altogether, and their negligent performance.
For instance, a municipal corporation may be authorized to construct sewers, and there is a high moral obligation on their part to
do so. The public good imperatively requires a system of sewerage in every city of any magnitude, but they are not bound to
build them, and no action will lie for a failure in this regard, however serious the consequences to the public or an individual may
be; for the municipal authorities are the sole judges of their
necessity.
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Adoption of plans for public u'orks fall within the rules of
exemption.
Nor will an action lie against a municipal corporation for an
injury resulting to individuals for a defect or want of sufficiency
in the plan or systems of a public improvement, adopted within
the authority conferred, and this exemption from liability is based
upon the assumption, that the adoption of a plan for a public
improvement, is the exercise of a legislative function, of a quasi
judicial nature, which is not the subject of review, in any form,
by the courts.
Hence, no action will lie as for a tort, for an
injury resulting to individuals by reason of a defect or want of
sufficiency in the plan or system of drainage, adopted within the
authority conferred, for the reason that the adoption of such plan
involves the exercise of a legislative function, of a quasi judicial
nature: Emery v. Lowell, 104 Mass. 15; Wilson v. Mayor of
New York, 1 Denio 595; Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich. 25;
Child v. Boston, 4 Allen 41; Aferrffield v. Worcester, 110 Mass.
216.
And if such plan, when adopted, be executed in a reasonably
proper and skilful manner, and an injury results to individual
property, the owner is remediless at common law, and must seek
compensation under the statute; for where such improvements are
authorized by public authority for public use in the exercise of
eminent domain, they cannot be unlawful: Perry v. The City of
Worcester, 6 Gray 546; iSprague v. The City of Worcester, 13
Gray 194. If, however, it is apparent that the adoption of the
plan, and its execution, however skilfully done, is, when completed,
necessarily and inevitably to cause an injury to contiguous private
property, the execution of such a plan would be regarded as an
act of negligence, and the municipality would be liable in tort for
the damages sustained: Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 235;
Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 Comst. 463; Perry v.
Worcester, 6 Gray 544; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 1 L. Rep., H. L.
Cas. 93 ; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208 ; Jones v. Bird,
5 B. & Aid. 837; Proprietors of -Locks v. Lowell, 7 Gray 223;
Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Montgomery v. Gilmer,
33 Ala. 116; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 742.
And where likewise, the adoption of a plan, and its most skilful
execution, would necessarily and inevitably expose to danger an
unsuspecting public, having a lawful right to share in the benefits
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and privileges of such public improvement, there would seem to
be no doubt of the liability of the municipality for a personal
injury sustained by reason thereof, for it would then fall within
tq analogy of a well-settled rule of law announced in a class of
cases which hold, that if the owner of real property permit a
dangerous excavation to remain unprotected, and which is closely
contiguous to a highway along or over which the public have the
right, or are accustomed to travel, he would be liable for injuries
received by one proceeding along such way with due care: .Pitts.,
.. :W. d6 . Railway Co. et al. v. Biniqkam, Adm'z., 29 Ohio St.
368; Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 393; Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25
Mich. 5; Corby v. Hill, 4 0. B. N. S. 556; Roscoe's Ev. at N.
1)., 14th ed., 685.
Or where an individual enters upon the premises of another
upon lawful business, by invitation, either express or implied, and
is injured by reason of their unsafe condition, the owner of such
premises would be liable, for he owes a duty to those having a
lawful right to be upon such premises, to see that they are secure
against accident and injury: Sweeny v. Old Colony and lYewport
Railroad Co., 10 Allen 873; Carleton et al. v. Franconia Iron
i Seel Co., 99 Mass. 216; Severy v. Nicker8on, 120 Id. 307.
But if such plan, when adopted with reasonable skill and care,
and executed without negligence, would not have the effect of
exposing the public necessarily and inevitably to danger, although
insufficient to afford complete immunity therefrom, the municipality,
at common law, would not be liable to damages for injuries
sustained: Detroitv. Beckman, 34"Mich. 25 ; Lansing v. Toolan,
37 Id. 152; Vanpelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa 808.
Thus, for instance, if a municipal corporation wanted to construct a ditch across a public way, it has the exclusive right to
determine whether such ditch shall be covered the full width of the
way or not, and the action of the corporation in this regard is not
the subject of review by the courts, for they cannot interfere with
the judicial functions of the corporation: Carrv. N-Vorthern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324.
But if, in constructing such ditch, the corporation should see
proper not to cover it the full width of the way, including footways
along the sides of such way, and should fail to erect sufficient
appliances and guard-rails to protect the public against injury, it
would unquestionably, and upon principle should be liable for any
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injury occurring by reason of such omission of duty: Chicago v.
Gallagher, 44 fll. 295; Chicago v. Langlass, 66 Id. 861. For
this would be regarded as an act of negligence in the execution
of the plan, which is a ministerial act, and for which a corporation
is liable in all cases, no matter how efficient the general plan of the
contemplated improvement may be: Child v. City of Boston, 4
Allen 41 ; Emery v. Lowell, 104 Mass. 16 ; Aerrifeld v. Worcester, 110 Id. 216.
Waterworks.
And the same thing may be said with respect to the power on
the part of a municipal corporation to construct and maintain a
system of waterworks. Now, no action will lie against the corporation for a neglect of this duty however necessary for the public
good; nor, if the corporation sees fit to do so, can the discretion
of the corporation as to the plan or extent of the system, or its
efficiency be controlled by the courts in any respect, but if the corporation proceeds to construct them, and does so negligently, to the
injury of person or property, it will be liable for the damages
sustained, to the same extent precisely, as an individual, under like
circumstances, would be liable: Southeote v. Stanley, 1 Ilurlst. &
N. 247; Hardeastle v. The ,South Yorkshire Railway Co., 4
Id 67; Scott v. Manchester, 2 Id. 204; Gibson v. Preston,
Law Rep., 5 Q. B. 219; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; Hill
v. Boston, 122 Id. 344; Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Id. 564; City
of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80.
Obstructions to naturalwatercourses.
Distinctly traceable to this principle with its attending qualification, is the right of municipal corporations to construct bridges and
culverts over natural watercourses which cross public ways. They
may adopt any plan they please, and no objection can be urged on
this account, but they must be sufficient to permit the flow of the
water to the same extent as before, and if they are not, but cause
the water to flow back to the injury of the property of another, the
corporation is liable to the same extent as any other corporation or
individual for similar acts: Wheeler v. City of Worcester, 10 Allen
591; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 358; Parkerv. Lowell, 11 Gray
853; Conrad v. Village of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158.
And the same thing may be said with respect to the pollution
of natural watercourses by the discharge of sewerage into them to
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the injury of riparian proprietors, not attributable to the plan of
sewerage adopted by the municipality, but to the improper construction, unreasonable use, or negligent care and management of
the sewers, such municipality is liable, precisely to the same extent
that riparian proprietors, interse, would be liable for any unreasonable use of the stream: Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216;
Child v. Boston, 4 Allen 41; Gold mid v. Tunbridge Wells Imp.
Co., Law Rep., 1 Ch. App. Cas. 349; s. c. Law Rep., 1 Eq. 161;
Higgins on Watercourses 96; Wood on Nuisances, section 688;
Hazeltine v. Case, 46 Wis. 891.
And the same principle, it is conceded, would apply to the discharge of sewerage, or other noxious substances upon an open area,
so as to pollute the surface water, and artificial channels, to the
injury of individual rights, precisely to the same extent, as between
conterminous or riparian proprietors: Goddard on Easements 63;
Gale on Easemeats 308; Johnson v. Jordan,2 Met. 234; -olisman
v. Boiling Spring Co., 1 McCarter 335 ; Merrifield v. Lombard,
13 Allen 16; Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 87; Washburn on
Easements.
If, however, the injured party be not a riparian or conterminous
proprietor, or one sustaining some private injury distinguishable
from that which results to the general public, by reason of the
acts of the municipality, then no action of a private character is
maintainable, at common law: Smith on Reparation 388.

Distinction with respect to obstructing natural 'watercourses,and
surface-water.
A distinction obtains, according to the common law, between
the obstructing of a natural watercourse with well-defined boundaries, and the obstruction to the flow of surface-water merely, by
a public improvement. In the one case, the corporation would be
liable, in the other not. As, for instance, where, within the limits
of a public way, the corporation should see proper to construct a
drain or culvert, and should also construct water-bars so as to
cause the surface-water to flow upon the adjacent property, no
action would lie against the corporation for a consequential injury,
and the reason assigned is, that the owner may do precisely the
same thing if he chooses, so as to throw the surface-water, either
upon the highway, or the land of his neighbor, without doing any
violence to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non lada*. even
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tlzuugh it be done in emulationem vicini: Plagg v. Woreester,
13 Gray 601; Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen 19; Barry v.
City of Lowell, 8 Id. 127; Bates v. Smith, 100 Mass. 182;
Emery v. Lowell, 104 Id. 16; XAorill v. Hurtty, 120 Id. 99.
While, according to the civil law, the rule is otherwise, and in
those courts following the latter, a municipality may render itself
liable by so constructing a public improvement, as to flood the
land of an adjoining proprietor, precisely to the same extent as
conterminous proprietors may, by such acts, render themselves
liable: Nevins v. Peoria,41 Ill. 502; Washburn on Easements
458; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 748; Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247;
City of Aurora v. Reed, 57 Ill. 29; Bloomington v. Brokaw,
77 Id. 194; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159.
With respect to public improvements generally.
And with respect to public works, it may be said generally, that
where, by any special charter accepted by a municipality, or
granted at its request, it is required to construct such public
works, and assess the expense thereof upon those immediately
benefited thereby, or to derive an advantage in its own corporate
capacity from the use thereof, by way of tolls or otherwise, it will
be liable as any other corporation, for anr injury done to any
person or property in the negligent exercise of the powers so conferred: ifenly v. Lyme, 5 Bing. 91; s. c. 3 B. & Ad. 77; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black 39; -Nebraska City v. Campbel4
2 Id. 590; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray 543; Child v. Boston,
4 Allen 41; Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Bloomington v.
Brokaw, 77 Ill. 194.
Dealingwith property heldfor private emolument or benefit.
And the same principle of liability obtains, where municipal
corporations hold or deal with property as their own, not for the
direct and immediate use of the public, but for their own benefit.
It then becomes liable to the same extent as a private individual
would be, for the negligent use of the same to the injury of
others: Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Oliver v. Worcester,
102 Mass. 500; Hill v. Boston, 122 Id. 359.
Application of this principle to quasi corporationsunder certain
circumstances.
And it is believed that this principle is applicable to quasi corVOL. XXVII.-94
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porations, fr ,. h organizations as counties and the like, when
dealing with property in no sense for public purposes, but for
private emolument solely, to the extent, at least, of the fund.
.Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 295.
'With respect to the duty of municipalities to maintain their
streets, bridges and sidewalks within their corporate limits, in a
reasonably safe condition, it would seem, that this is one of those
implied obligations resulting from the very nature and purpose of
their organization, so manifestly intended to be imposed by the
sovereign authority, in consideration of the privileges and franchises confe, red, and so essentially necessary to the comfort aijd
well being of the citizen that it needs no other argument in support of the proposition, and the great weight of reason and authority is this way: 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sect. 789;
2 Thomp. on Neg. 758; City of Chicago v. Boy, 75 Ill. 530;
City of Chicago v. Brophy, 79 Id. 277.
And as a corollary from this proposition, such corporations have
the undoubted right to graduate their streets and walks, and make
such changes in the surface of the ground as in the judgment
of its officers the public necessities require, and so long as they
confine themselves within the scope of their authority, and execute
the work with reasonable skill and care, although such improvement may occasionally cause serious injury to a contiguous property holder, yet he is remediless, except in the mode and to the
extent the legislature has seen proper to furnish him relief: Wills
on Eminent Domain, sect. 195; 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sects. 781, 798; Pery v. Worcester, 6 Gray 546; Shearman & Redfield, sect. 370; 2 Thompson on Negligence 747; City
of Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 111. 337; Scovil v. Geddings,
7 Ohio 562; ifickox v. Cleveland, 8 Id. 543. Where an individual owns vacant property., or where he has recklessly improved
his property without exercising any care in doing so with reference
to a probable future reasonable grade of the street, the pnnciple
stated, would not seem to be objectionable; but where a property
owner has in good faith made improvements with reference to an
already established grade which he has good reason to believe to
be permanent in its character, and his property rendered valueless by a subsequent alteration, the principle seems harsh and
inequitable, and under such circumstances, an eminent court has
refused to adopt it: Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St.
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465; City of Cincinnati v. Penn1 , 21 Id. 499; Youngstown v.
Moore, 30 Id. 142; Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 Id. 334.
So far, we have been considering the acts of municipal corporations, and the acts of these quasi corporate organizations while in
the exercise of due care, they were performing duties imposed by
law, within the scope of their authority either in constructing public improvements, and in maintaining them, in the same way, or
proceeding negligently in this regard.
If a municipal corporation were to proceed, however, to construct
a public improvement, or to do any other act not within the scope
of its authority, then it would clearly not be liable as a tortfeasor,
for injuries sustained either to person or property, and whether its
acts were done in the exercise of due care, or otherwise, would not
make the slightest difference: Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met. 286;
Smith v. Buffalo, 1 Sheld. 493; 1 Potter on Corporations 465;
2 Thomp. on Neg. 737; Smith on Reparation 390; Murphy v.
City of Louisville, 9 Bush 89. If, however, it were proceeding
to construct a public improvement, clearly authorized by law, but
were doing so in an illegal manner, then the corporation would
be liable: Goodloe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500 ; Smith v. Cincinnati,
Id. 514; Fisher v. Lowell, 11 Gray 345.
And the same rule would extend to involuntary quasi corporations, actiag beyond the scope of their authority: Commimaioners
of Hamilton County v. 3Iighels, 7 Ohio St. 116.
But because a municipal corporation, acting ultra vires, would
not be liable, it does not follow that an individual, injured in his
person or estate by the acts of the agents and servants of such
corporation would be remediless, for it is well settled that under
such circumstances, so far as municipal corporations are concerned,
their agents and servants would be liable, whether their acts were
characterized by the exercise of reasonable care or not: Shepherd
v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250; Tearney v. Smith, 86 Ill. 391;
-Elderv. Bemis, 2 Met. 599; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 823.
And with respect to officers of involuntary quasi corporations,
such as counties and the like, which are not liable to actions for
the negligence of such officers to the injuries resulting to person
or property, simply because of the peculiar nature and purposes
of these organizations. Yet the officers of such organizations are
so far liable that they must respond for their own personalnegli;ence, but not for the negligence of their subordinates: Hall v.

